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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
vs. : Case Nos. 14824 
14825 
GEORGE K. COMISH, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, George K. Cornish, appeals from 
judgments of conviction and sentences thereon in two separate 
cases entered against him in the Third Judicial District Court 
for the crime of unlawful distribution for value of a con-
trolled substance. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant George K. Cornish was convicted by the 
court in two cases of the crime of unlawful distribution for 
value of a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant George K. Cornish seeks the reversal 
of the court below and an order that the court below enter 
a judgment of not guilty as to each case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These cases were tried upon stipulated facts to 
the court sitting without a jury. In Case No. 14824 the 
stipulated facts show that Appellant George K. Cornish on 
September 16, 1975, sold a controlled substance, to wit: 
marijuana, to Terry Wright, a police officer employed by the 
University of Utah who was acting under the supervision of 
one Larry Hedberg, a deputized member of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office. (R. 47,48) This purchase of marijuana took 
place at the defendant's residence which was not on the Uni-
 ( 
versity of Utah property. (R.48) It was further stipulated 
that Terry Wright was not a special deputy. (R.49) Exhibit 2 
was received (R.50) and that exhibit showed that Terry Wright ^ 
was driving around Salt Lake City, picked up some hitch hikers, 
asked them where he could buy some marijuana, was taken to the 
home of appellant where he testified he purchased marijuana < 
from Appellant George K. Cornish. 
In Case No. 14825 the stipulated facts were to 
i 
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the same effect as the previous case except the date of the 
transaction was October 25, 1975. (R.47) The purchase was 
made at the same place, by the same officer, who, according 
to his report (Exhibit 2) went there on his own on this 
occasion. 
After the submission of the case to the court 
on stipulated facts the court received memorandums from both 
parties and took the matter under advisement, later denying 
appellant's motion to dismiss made on the basis that the 
evidence of the State consisted solely of uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice, Terry Wright, because Officer 
Wright was acting without his jurisdiction because the trans-
action was not related to the University of Utah, its property, 
or its interests. 
The court took appellant's motions under advisement 
and later on August 24, 1976, denied the motion and found 
appellant guilty in each case. (R.33) 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
INFORMATIONS BECAUSE THE STATE'S 
CASES WERE BASED ENTIRELY UPON 
TESTIMONY OF AN UNCORROBORATED 
ACCOMPLICE. 
Appellant contends that his convictions must be 
set aside because they are based upon the uncorroborated 
3 
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testimony of an accomplice. 
The person to whom appellant allegedly sold the 
controlled substance was a member of the University of Utah 
Police Department. Under Utah Code Annotated, Section 53-45-5 
(1953) members of such a police department have "such powers 
as peace officers in cities and by sheriffs but they may be 
exercised only in cities where the institution is located and 
"only in connection with actions occurring on the property 
of such institution or when required for the protection of 
its interests, property, students or employees; and otherwise 
within such counties when specifically requested by the State 
or local law enforcement officials having jurisdiction." This 
court in State of Utah in the interest of Hurley, 28 U.2d 
248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972) dealt with the above statute. This 
court explained that the legislative intent was to restrict 
the extraterritorial exercise of the power of institutional 
police with one exception, that being when required for the 
protection of student interests. This court said, 28 U.2d 
at 251, "thus, the legislature, in this exception, has granted 
power to these institutional police, beyond the property of 
the institution, only under some type of exigent circum- ^ 
stances, where the direct and immediate interests of the insti-
tution concerning its property, students, or employees is 
involved. { 
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Appellant contends that the general interests of 
curbing drug abuse and apprehending offenders of Utah's 
Controlled Substances Act is not the kind of interest this 
court and the statute contemplate when they say that exigent 
circumstances must exist before University Police are given 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Based upon the above analysis appellant contends 
it is clear that Mr. Terry Wright was not engaged in any 
official duty and thus made the alleged purchase purely and 
simply as a private citizen and he stands on no different 
footing than any private citizen. 
Mr. Wright thus is clearly an accomplice under 
our criminal code. Utah Code Annotated, 76-2-202(1953), as 
amended, states as follows: 
Every person, acting with the 
mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally 
liable as a party for such conduct. 
Under the facts as stated there can be no question but that 
Mr. Wright solicited, requested, encouraged and intentionally 
aided Mr. Cornish, appellant herein, to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense. The stipulated facts show that Mr. 
5 
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Wright went to the home of appellant and asked him to sell 
a controlled substance and there can be no real question but 
that such conduct on behalf of Mr. Wright amounted to a 
solicitation or request or encouragement or aid of an offense. 
The question then becomes, did Mr. Wright "act with the mental 
state required for the commission of an offense"? Appellant 
contends he clearly did. 
For Mr. Cornish to commit the offense under Utah 
Code Annotated, 58-37-8 (1) (a) (1953) it is required that the 
State prove that-the person acts "knowingly and intentionally". 
The terms "knowingly" and "intentionally" are defined in 
Utah Code Annotated, 76-2-103 (1953). In essence those 
statutory definitions say that if a person has a conscious 
objective to engage in certain conduct he acts "intelligently" 
and if he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause a result he acts "knowingly". It cannot be validly 
claimed by the State that Mr. Wright did not knowingly or 
intentionally act in soliciting and encouraging an offense. 
Of course, the definition of who is responsible for a crime 
in Utah Code Annotated, 76-2-202 and the above definitions 
are applicable to the Controlled Substances Act under which ^ 
appellant WcxS charged because of the provisions in 76-1-103 
(1953), which provide that the criminal code governs the 
( 
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construction of, the punishment for, and the defense against 
any offense defined in the criminal code or, except where 
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise 
requires, any offense defined outside the criminal code. 
For the State to convict appellant of the offense 
as charged it has only to prove that appellant acted inten-
tionally and knowingly and distributed a controlled substance. 
That same intent is all tha t is required of a person who solicits 
or requests or encourages the commission of those acts. 
Therefore, it is clear that Mr. Wright did have the intent 
required for the commission of the offense. 
Thus it can be seen that Mr. Terry Wright acted 
with the mental state required to commit the offense, knowingly 
or intentionally, and he solicited, encouraged, requested, 
and aided in the commission of an offense. Mr. Wright is 
thus as criminally responsible as Mr. Cornish under Utah Code 
Annotated, 76-2-202, (1953). To be equally criminally respon-
sible means that Mr. Wright is an accomplice in that he could 
be charged with the same offense as appellant. See, for 
example, State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94 (1929). 
Under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 77-31-18, it is clear that a person may not be 
convicted solely on the testimony of an accomplice without 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
some corroboration. 
The testmiony of an accomplice must be corroborated 
by other independent testimony or evidence. This corrobor-
ating evidence must, standing alone, tend to implicate and 
connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, and 
this corroborating evidence or testimony must be inconsistent 
with the defendant's innocence and consistent only with guilt 
and must do more than cast a grave suspicion on the defendant. 
See, for example, State v. Erwin, 105 Utah 3 65, 120 P.2d 
V 285 (1961); State v. Sinclair, 150 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 
465 (1964). Thus, for the State to contend that there is 
any corroborating evidence is a misleading argument. For 
the State to argue that because a controlled substance was 
introduced into evidence that this exhibit corroborates 
Mr. Wright is not convincing. Appellant contends that the 
character of a substance provides no corroboration as to the 
source of the substance. Appellant contends that Mr. Wright's 
testimony as to where he obtained the substance is what must 
be corroborated and for the State to argue that Mr. Wright's 
testimony that he obtained marijuana from appellant is 
corroborated by the presence of marijuana sorely misses 
appellant's contention that the source of the obtaining is 
what is crucial. 
8 
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Clearly there is no corroboration in this matter 
as to the source of the controlled substance. 
Appellant realizes that this court has dealt in 
the past with the contention that a person who purchases a con-
trolled substance is an accomplice. See, for example, State v. 
Kasai, 27 U.2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972). Of course, that case 
was decided before the effective date of our criminal code and 
so appellant's main point, the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 
76-2-202 (1953), was not considered. Appellant contends that 
our recent criminal code has altered the ruling required by 
the rationale of Kasai and similar cases. More importantly, 
appellant is not contending that all law enforcement officers 
who make purchases of controlled substances are accomplices 
of the seller. Only when the purchaser is a law enforcement 
officer acting outside of his jurisdiction, and thus as a 
private citizen, is he an accomplice, and that is what appellant's 
argument contends. 
Utah Code Annotated, 77-13-36 (1953) does not 
expand the jurisdiction of the University of Utah Police 
Officers under the circumstances of this case. That statute 
provides that any police officer duly authorized by any 
governmental entity of the state may exercise a peace 
officer's authority beyond the limits of his normal jurisdic-
tion when, among other things not relevant here, a public 
9 
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offense is committed in such officer's presence. 
Initially appellant contends that the statute 
applies to an officer authorized by any "governmental entity" 
of the state. Defendant contends that the University of Utah 
is not a governmental entity of the State of Utah and so the 
statute in its entirety is inapplicable. Second, and more 
importantly, subparagraph (2) of 77-13-36 requires that before 
the statute is operative a peace officer acting out of his 
jurisdiction shall notify and receive approval of the local 
law enforcement authority before acting and if that is not 
possible, notification must be given as soon as is reasonably 
possible thereafter. Under the facts of this case there was 
no evidence before the court that Mr. Wright did not have time 
to inform appropriate local Salt Lake City or Salt Lake County 
authorities of his proposed action and there was no evidence 
before the court that after his activities he notified the 
appropriate local law enforcement authorities. For these 
reasons appellant contends the statute is unavailable to the 
State to help broaden the territorial jurisdiction of the 
University of Utah Police officers under these circumstances. 
While the stipulated facts before the court indi-
cate that officer Hedberg was a sworn deputy of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office, defendant contends that the statute 
10 
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allows extraterritorial police power when a request is made 
by a member of a local law enforcement agency, not by a 
member of an institutional police department who has been 
sworn to act as a local law enforcement officer. 
Further, a careful reading of the statute shows 
the clear legislative intent to not simply allow peace 
officers of any jurisdiction to roam about the state of 
Utah and solicit and request and encourage the commission of 
crime but rather to assist them in what amounts to exigent 
circumstances. That is, when in hot pursuit or when called 
upon specifically to assist other officers or to continue 
an ongoing investigation a peace officer of one territorial 
jurisdiction may exercise authority beyond the limits of 
his normal jurisdiction. When a peace officer is out of his 
jurisdiction and happens to view an offense occurring in 
his presence he can also act. However, there is a vast differ-
ence between a police officer simply viewing an offense being 
committed by happenstance and actively and ongoingly engaging 
in a solicitation and a request that an offense be committed. 
Thus, if Mr. Wright were simply in downtown Salt Lake City 
and observed an offense being committed in his presence he 
could act under the above statute. However, for him to 
encourage and solicit an offense is a different matter and 
one that we are faced with here and one which should be con-
11 
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demned. The above statute speaks in terms of gaining approval 
when planned activity is contemplated and should in no way 
be interpreted as a license for peace officers to roam the 
state of Utah or any other jurisdiction and attempt to make 
crimes occur. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, that appellant was 
convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, 
appellant respectfully submits that the judgments of the court 
below should be reversed and the lower court should be ordered 
to enter a judgment of not guilty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bruce C. Lubeck 
Attorney for Appellant 
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